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CONTAINER CORPORATION OF AMERICA V FRANCHISE
TAX BOARD: THE SUPREME COURT ENCOURAGES
APPORTIONMENT TAXATION
State apportionment taxation of corporate income remains con-
troversial. In the most recent case, Container Corporation of
America v. Franchise Tax Board,1 the California Franchise Tax
Board applied an apportionment formula to the worldwide income
of the Container Corporation of America, a unitary business. The
corporation argued that this tax violated both the due process
clause2 and the commerce clause3 of the United States Constitu-
tion. The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the cor-
poration's arguments and held that state taxation of a unitary bus-
iness' worldwide income under an apportionment formula violates
neither due process nor the commerce clause.
This Note reviews the Supreme Court's analysis of state appor-
tionment taxation in the Container case and addresses the consti-
tutionality of the apportionment formula as applied to foreign-
owned unitary businesses.4 The Note concludes that the Supreme
Court in Container did not adequately address the effects on for-
eign policy of state worldwide apportionment taxation.
FORMULA APPORTIONMENT AND THE UNITARY BusiNEss CONCEPT
The Formula Apportionment Taxation Method
Corporate taxes are calculated by one of three methods: separate
accounting, geographical allocation, and formula apportionment.5
1. 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. The Court in Container expressly reserved this issue. 103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.26.
5. For an excellent recent work on state taxation, see J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION I-
CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHIsE TAXEs (1983) [heremafter cited as STATE TAXATION I];
see also J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION (4th ed. 1978). A
good collection of essays on worldwide apportionment taxation before Container may be
found m THE STATE CORPORATION INcoME TAx. ISSUES IN WORLDWIDE UNITARY COMBINATION
(C. McLure ed. 1984). For a detailed discussion of state taxation m light of federalism, see
P HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMrrATONS ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION (1981). A number of law
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The separate accounting method, which the federal government
uses, treats parent corporations and their subsidiaries as separate
entities for tax purposes if the corporations deal with each other at
arm's length.' The geographical allocation method attributes all in-
come to the state of its source, where it is taxed in full.7 The ap-
portionment method, which most states use, allows a state to tax a
corporation's income according to the degree of the corporation's
activities within the state.8 States using apportionment argue that
the separate accounting method enables businesses to shift income
to avoid taxation.9 Apportioning income allows the state to weigh
the taxed entity's state operations against its overall operations to
achieve a better estimate of the business' true income for state tax
purposes. The unitary business principle is the foundation of the
apportionment scheme because this principle defines the opera-
tions that factor into the apportionment formula.10
States are not limited to one particular method of apportion-
ment.1" Nevertheless, most states use a three-factor formula that
weighs the payroll, property, and sales of the company's operations
within the state against the payroll, property, and sales of the
review articles have been written on the subject. See, e.g., Hellerstem, Recent Developments
in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX
J. 487 (1968); W Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations,
Part II: Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1982); Hellerstem,
State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations and the Supreme Court, 35
NAT'L TAX J. 401 (1982); Note, State Taxation of Nondomiciliary Corporations, 40 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 191 (1983).
6. See I.R.C. § 901 (1982); J. HELLERSTEIN & W HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 432; see
also STATE TAXATION I, supra note 5, T 8.3.
7. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 398; see also STATE TAXATION
I, supra note 5, 8.4.
8. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 399; see also STATE TAXATION
I, supra note 5, 1 8.5.
9. Under the federal scheme, the Internal Revenue Service can reallocate income to com-
bat corporate attempts to shift income to avoid taxation. See I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
10. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980) (the unitary
business principle is the "linchpin" of apportionment).
11. See Container, 103 S. Ct. 2943 ("[A] fairly apportioned tax would not be found inva-
lid simply because it differed from the prevailing approach adopted by the States."); see
also id. at 2941.
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whole, or unitary, business.1 2 The Court in Container viewed this
three-part formula as the "benchmark" for determining taxable in-
come under the apportionment method of taxation.13
The Unitary Business Concept
The concept of the unitary business arose with the first inter-
state railroads.14 States through which railroads ran quickly real-
ized that taxing a proportionate share of the railroad's entire oper-
ation would raise more money than taxing merely the track itself.
Upholding this scheme in the State Railroad Cases,5 the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that taxes upon the track alone
would produce little revenue and would not reflect the true value
of the track to the railroad's operation; the railroad "must be re-
garded, for many, indeed most purposes, as a unit."1 6
The unitary business concept recognizes that an integrated, mul-
tifaceted business generates income not picked up by the separate
accounting method of taxation. Because this integration yields ex-
12.
In-State In-State In-State
Property of Payroll of Sales of
All Unitary All Unitary All Unitary Combined
Corporations Corporations Corporations Total Net
Operating in Operating in Operating in Income* Income
State State State Earned Earned
Everywhere Within
+ + X By the = The
Unitary Taxing
Everywhere Everywhere Everywhere Group State
Property of Payroll of Sales of
Unitary Group Unitary Group Unitary Group
AVERAGED BY DIVIDING THESE FACTORS BY
THREE
*All intercorporate transactions are eliminated in this formula. Whitenack, State Tax Lit-
igation After the Container Decision: The Potential Tax Break for Foreign Nationals, 20
TAX NoTEs 771, 771 (1983). This formula is embodied in the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).
13. 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
14. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); State R.R. Tax
Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875); see also Weissman, Unitary Taxation: Its History and Recent
Supreme Court Treatment, 48 ALBANY L. R~v. 48 (1984).
15. 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
16. Id. at 608.
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tra savings and income, the true value of the corporation's activi-
ties within the state can be determined properly only by referring
to the income of the company's entire operation. 7
CHALLENGING STATE APPORTIONMENT TAXATION
Corporations often have contended that apportionment taxation
violates both the due process clause and the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution. 8 In Container, however, the Su-
preme Court approved both the unitary business concept and the
use of the apportionment formula.' The apportionment method's
constitutionality under the interstate commerce clause and the due
process clause therefore appears secure. A review of the Court's
analysis with regard to these two constitutional provisions, how-
ever, reveals weaknesses in its analysis of the foreign commerce
clause issue. 0
Due Process Clause
Satisfaction of the due process requirements is a threshold ques-
17. Originally, "unitary" analysis was more rigid, involving examination of "unities," such
as ownership and management. See STATE TAXATION I, supra note 5, 1 8.5, at 332. The Court
has developed a less formal standard, relying on functional aspects of the taxed entity. See
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 224-25 (1980); see also STATE:
TAXATION I, supra note 5, 8.11, at 424; Note, State Taxation of Multinationals and The
Unitary Business Concept: A Contemporary View, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 115 (1984).
18. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983); ASARCO
Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F W Woolworth Co. v. Taxation &
Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S.
207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434
U.S. 452 (1978); Norfolk & W Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968);
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 337 U.S. 436 (1964); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315
U.S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
19. 103 S. Ct. at 2945-50. Although the Court expressed hostility to further constitutional
challenges to apportionment, id. at 2946, the opinion may have invited even more litigation
by failing to outline adequately the proper standards by which the lower courts are to deter-
mine what constitutes a unitary business. In Container, the Court showed deference to the
state's reliance on a number of factors in determining unitarmness. See id. at 2948 ("We need
not decide whether any one of these factors would be sufficient as a constitutional matter to
prove the existence of a unitary business.").
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21-40.
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tion in state tax challenges.21 A jurisdictionally sufficient nexus
must exist between the corporation and the taxing state to justify
the state's taxation of income generated outside the state. Due pro-
cess requires some minimal connection between the activities taxed
and the taxing state,22 and a rational relation between the taxed
income and "values connected with the taxing state."23 Essentially,
a state cannot tax beyond its borders.24
What constitutes taxation by a state beyond its borders, how-
ever, is unclear. The unitary business principle is based on the pre-
mise that "economies of scale, centralization and integration" add
to the profits of the whole,25 and consequently, profits of the parts.
If these premises are true, the apportionment method does not m
fact tax income generated beyond the state's borders. The diffi-
culty with the apportionment scheme is that, as applied, particu-
larly in the foreign commerce area, it allows the state to tax at
levels that simply do not reflect the activities conducted within the
state.26 For example, in Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of
Taxes,27 Mobil operated at a loss in Vermont, yet paid taxes
there.2 8 Without income, tax liability such as this seems
incongruous.
Commerce Clause
The due process clause and the commerce clause analyses over-
lap. In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,29 the United States Su-
preme Court placed four limitations on state taxation of interstate
21. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW, § 6-15, at 353 (1978).
22. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756
(1967).
23. See Norfolk & Western R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968); see
also Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954) ("[D]ue process requires some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or trans-
action it seeks to tax.").
24. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930).
25. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
26. Critics argue that cost differences, different accounting standards, and different ex-
change rates result in a skewed depiction of the foreign company's formula "factors."
Milton. The States Have Made It A Nightmare, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, § F, at 2, col. 3.
27. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
28. Id. at 430.
29. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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commerce:30 (1) the tax must be applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) the tax must be fairly appor-
tioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate against interstate com-
merce; and (4) the activity must be fairly related to the taxing
state.31 The first and last prongs of the test mirror the due process
concern of an adequate connection between the taxed activity and
the taxing state.32 At the core of the commerce clause analysis,
however, is the concern that the state will utilize its taxing powers
to discriminate against interstate commerce.3 3 The Court, there-
fore, has frequently invalidated state taxes that provide a local in-
dustry with an advantage over an out-of-state corporation doing
business within the state.3 4
That the state employs an apportionment formula and other
states do not is considered by the Court to be nondiscriminatory,
however.3 5 As the Court has pointed out, "the anti-discrimination
principle has not in practice required much in addition to the re-
quirement of fair apportionment."3 6 The Court has defined fair ap-
portionment very broadly- an apportionment scheme is fair if it is
internally and externally consistent.3 ' An internally consistent ap-
portionment scheme would "if applied by every jurisdiction,
result in no more than all of the umtary business's income being
taxed."38 External consistency, in contrast, exists when the factors
used in the apportionment formula reasonably measure the sources
of income. For a business to challenge successfully a tax scheme
on this basis, it must prove "by 'clear and cogent evidence' that
the income attributed to the State is in fact 'out of all appropriate
proportions to the business transacted in that State' or has
30. Additional tests are applied if foreign commerce is the subject of state taxation. See
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 444-51 (1979).
31. 430 U.S. at 279.
32. The Court uses interchangeably "substantial nexus" and "minimum connection" in
state tax cases. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756
(1967).
33. For an excellent historical survey, see Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce-Quiet Revolution or Much Ado About Nothing?, 38 TAx L. REv. 127 (1982).
34. L. TrBE, supra note 21, § 6-16, at 354-55.
35. See 103 S. Ct. at 2943.
36. Id.





'led to a grossly distorted result.' ",40
Recent Developments
Container is the latest in a series of corporate challenges to ap-
portionment taxation. In ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com-
mission41 and F W Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue De-
partment,42 the challenges succeeded. In Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes,43 and more importantly in Container,
however, the Court upheld expansive apportionment plans. In Mo-
bil, for example, the Court allowed Vermont's taxing authorities to
apportion income that included dividend income from Mobil's
overseas subsidiaries and affiliates. Similarly, in Container the
Court permitted a state to determine a corporation's franchise tax
on the basis of total worldwide income. The apportionment
method, therefore, has evolved to the point where states now in-
clude in the apportionment formula not only income from inter-
state commerce but also income from international commerce.
Companies that carry on international business naturally object
vigorously to this expansion.
THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FORMULA APPORTIONMENT
In Container, The Container Corporation argued that Califor-
nia's franchise tax violated both the commerce clause and the due
process clause. The attack failed even though California's use of
apportionment resulted in double taxation. A challenge based on
the foreign commerce clause 44 also failed. The Court's analysis of
this issue, however, was faulty
History of the Foreign Commerce Clause
History supports the view that states, acting in their capacity as
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
42. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
43. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power [t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign nations ").
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states, should have little or no influence over foreign affairs.4"
Under the Articles of Confederation," Congress had no power to
regulate commerce.47 The dismal failure of the Union under the
Articles can be blamed in part on this lack of national control over
trade.48 James Madison described the practical problems hindering
the development of the young nation:
[S]ome of the states, which have no convenient ports for foreign
commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, through
whose ports their commerce was carried on. New Jersey, placed
between Philadelphia and New York, was likened to a cask
tapped at both ends and North Carolina, between Virginia
and North Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms.49
The activity of freewheeling, independent states wreaked havoc on
interstate and international trade.50 The Framers of the new Con-
stitution unanimously favored reform.5' The Framers sought to
avoid the problems that arose under the Articles by explicitly vest-
mg the power to define foreign relations in Congress5 2 rather than
in the individual states.5 3
Case law following ratification of the Constitution supports the
view that foreign commerce is an exclusively federal concern. In
Gibbons v. Ogden,54 for example, the United States Supreme Court
held that New York's grant of a monopoly affecting navigation be-
tween New York and New Jersey conflicted with a federal statute
licensing such interstate commerce and, therefore, was void under
45. State governments of course can influence the federal government in the formulation
of foreign policy.
46. The Articles were the nation's first effort to construct a workable federal structure.
The loose confederation of states linked by a weak national government proved untenable.
See generally P SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIvE HISTORY 71-92
(1978). The national government's failure to enforce the Treaty of Paris of 1783 was evi-
dence of problems with the Articles. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 46 (1913).
47. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
48. M. FARRAND, supra note 46, at 45.
49. J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 33 (1840).
50. Madison attributed Great Britain's monopolizing practices to a "want of authority in
Congress to regulate commerce " Id. at 46.
51. M. FARRAND, supra note 46, at 45-47.
52. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
54. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
690 [Vol. 26:683
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the supremacy clause. Although the decision was based on the
supremacy clause, Chief Justice Marshall indicated in the opinion
that congressional power to regulate "commercial intercourse" ex-
tended to all activity having an interstate impact, however indi-
rect. Marshall contended that "when a state proceeds to regulate
commerce with foreign nations it is exercising the very power
that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing that Con-
gress is authorized to do."'55 Justice Johnson, in his concurring
opinion, also concluded that the regulation of foreign commerce is
exclusively a federal concern: "But the power to regulate foreign
commerce is necessarily exclusive. The states are unknown to for-
eign nations; their sovereignty exists only with relation to each
other and the general government." 56
The application of the foreign commerce clause to state taxation
can be traced to Brown v. Maryland.57 Primarily an import-export
clause58 case, Brown examined the constitutionality of an import
licensing scheme. 59 Discussing the limitations of state taxing power
in the context of the commerce clause, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that "the taxing power of the states must have some limits.
It cannot reach and restrain the action of the national government
within its proper sphere. '60
Since the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has left
no doubt that the power over foreign commerce and foreign affairs
is the exclusive province of either the legislative branch, the execu-
tive branch, or both. As a result of this broad interpretation, dis-
putes over jurisdiction in foreign matters generally have been be-
tween Congress and the President rather than between the states
and the federal government. 1
The Modern Foreign Commerce Clause Analysis Before Container
Few modern cases have discussed the foreign commerce clause.
55. Id. at 199-200.
56. Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
57. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). For a general analysis of the conflict between federal
and state taxation, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
59. 25 U.S. at 436.
60. Id. at 448.
61. See L. TRIE, supra note 21, at § 4-3.
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Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles6 2 contains perhaps the
most fully developed foreign commerce analysis to date. In Japan
Line, a Japanese corporation challenged California's attempt to
impose an ad valorem property tax on their shipping containers.6 3
The foreign corporation asserted that the tax produced interna-
tional double taxation and thereby violated both the home port
doctrine 4 and the foreign commerce clause. 5 In considering the
case's foreign commerce issues, the Court maintained that even if
the tax satisfied the Complete Auto Transit four-pronged test,66
further analysis was necessary because the case required the Court
to "constru[e] Congress' power to 'regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations.' "67 Because of this need for a more extensive constitu-
tional inquiry, the Court employed two additional disjunctive tests:
(1) whether the tax creates a substantial risk of international
double taxation, and (2) whether the state tax "prevents the Fed-
eral Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.'"68 In requiring
additional scrutiny of state taxes affecting foreign commerce, the
Court expressed concern over the lack of recourse available to for-
eign businesses victimized by double taxation. 9 The need for fed-
eral uniformity "where federal uniformity is essential"70 also mili-
tated against identical treatment of foreign and interstate
commerce problems.
Later cases and commentators have construed Japan Line nar-
rowly 7 l1 These courts and commentators base their narrow con-
62. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
63. Id. at 437.
64. The basic premise of the home port doctrine is that vessels are properly taxable in
their home ports. Id. at 441-42. The Court in Japan Line refused to rule on the home port
issue, instead basing its decision on the commerce clause. Id. at 442-44. For a discussion of
the home port doctrine, see Comment, Limitations on State Taxation of Foreign Com-
merce: The Contemporary Validity of the Home-Port Doctrine, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 817
(1979).
65. 441 U.S. at 442-43.
66. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
67. 441 U.S. at 446.
68. Id. at 451.
69. Id. at 447.
70. Id. at 448.
71. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980); Alcan Alumi-
num Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F Supp. 624, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also STATE TAXA-
[Vol. 26:683
APPORTIONMENT TAXATION
struction on the Court's use of the term "instrumentalities of com-
merce ' 72 and on the nature of the challenged tax in Japan Line.
Until Container the United States Supreme Court refused to apply
the Japan Line analysis to any case in which a property tax was
not at issue.7" The sweeping language and the depth of analysis
that the Court used in Japan Line, however, warrant a broader
reading of the case.74
Container and the Foreign Commerce Clause
Although the Court in Container deliberately emphasized the
narrow reading of Japan Line,7 5 it applied the Japan Line tests in
considering the constitutionality of the California income tax. The
Court maintained that the California tax was constitutional de-
spite the possibility that it might impose double taxation because
the Japan Line tests did not impose any absolute prohibition on
"state-induced double taxation in the international context. 176 The
closer scrutiny mandated by the foreign commerce clause simply
required a court to take into consideration "the context in which
the double taxation takes place and the alternatives reasonably
available to the taxmg state."'7 The Court contended that Califor-
TION I, supra note 5, 914.15; Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979),
5 INT'L TRADE L. J. 319 (1980); Note, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-State Tax of
Instrumentalities of Foreign Commerce Invalid When Tax Results in Multiple Taxation
and Impairs Federal Uniformity in Regulation of Foreign Trade, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
999 (1979). Contra Hellerstem, State's Power to Tax Foreign Commerce Dominates Su-
preme Court's Agenda, 51 J. TAX'N 106 (1979).
72. 441 U.S. at 444; see, e.g., Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F. Supp.
624, 629 (1983).
73. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980). The
perfunctory treatment given the foreign commerce clause issue m Mobil is due in part to the
way the case was presented to the Court. See id. ("[P]roblems of multiple taxation at
the international level are simply not germane to the issue of multiple state taxation
that appellant has framed.").
74. This seems particularly true when one considers the reasons that the Court gave to
justify heightened analysis under the foreign commerce clause. Lack of a proper remedy
when foreign entities are taxed is just as likely under a property tax as under an income or
franchise tax. Likewise, the concern for federal uniformity would play a role regardless of
the object being taxed; foreign businesses and governments are annoyed either way.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2952 n.24. The Court distinguished Japan Line, but then applied the
Japan Line tests. Id.
76. Id. at 2953.
77. Id.
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nia had no reasonable alternative. The decision not to tax at all
was unreasonable," and although the arm's length method was a
valid alternative, it was neither necessarily effective7 9 nor man-
dated.80 Because all of the other alternatives available to California
also could produce double taxation, the Court concluded that Cali-
fornia's use of a worldwide apportionment formula for assessing its
franchise tax did not violate the foreign commerce clause.s '
The Court also found that the California tax did not interfere
with federal uniformity and therefore did not violate the second
part of the Japan Line test. In general, a state tax interferes with
federal uniformity only if the tax "either implicates foreign policy
issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a
clear federal directive. 8 2 Although noting that it possessed "little
competence" in the foreign policy area and could only "develop ob-
jective standards that reflect very general observations about the
imperatives of international trade and international relations," the
Court maintained that the tax did not implicate foreign policy is-
sues-it merely had "foreign resonances."83 The Court observed,
for example, that the tax did not create any "automatic 'asymme-
try'" in international taxation, and that retaliation was thus un-
likely 8 4 Furthermore, because the Container Corporation was in-
corporated in the United States, the "legal incidence" of the tax
was domestic.8 5
In addition to finding that the California tax did not implicate
any foreign policy issues, the Court also found that the tax did not
violate any federal statutes or treaties and therefore was not incon-
sistent with any federal directive.8 ' In reaching this conclusion, the
Court pointed out Congress' failure to pass any legislation on this
78. Id.
79. Id. The dissent in Container disagreed with this conclusion. According to Justice
Powell, double taxation is an inherent by-product of worldwide apportionment. The arm's
length method produces double taxation only in certain circumstances, and in those circum-
stances the double taxation effect can be eliminated. Id. at 2958-59.
80. See supra note 11.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2956.
82. Id. at 2955 (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 2955-56; see infra notes 98 & 204 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 2956-57.
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matter after many years of debate s7 as well as to the failure of the
Solicitor General to file an amicus curiae brief in the case .8 These
factors led the Court to conclude that the tax was neither "fatally
inconsistent with federal policy" nor "pre-empted by federal
law."89
THE Container DISSENT APPLIES THE Japan Line TEST
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor,9 maintained that the California taxing scheme violated
the foreign commerce clause.9 ' Applying the two-part Japan Line
test, Justice Powell attacked the majority's failure to recognize the
double taxation that results from any scheme that bases its tax on
the total assets of a unitary business that is more profitable, or
engages in more business,92 outside of the taxing state. 3 Double
taxation results because the income earned by a corporation in a
foreign country is reflected m both the state's apportionment
formula as well as in the foreign country's tax. Theoretically, if
both the state and the foreign country used the same apportion-
ment formula, no double taxation would result because both taxing
entities would be taxing their proportionate share of the corpora-
tion's total income. As Justice Powell observed, however, most for-
eign countries apply an arm's length rather than an apportionment
system of taxation.9 4 Under an arm's length system, the foreign na-
tion taxes all, rather than a proportionate share, of the corpora-
tion's total income. Consequently, if the foreign nation taxes all of
the income, and each state taxes its proportionate share of that
same income, double taxation inevitably results. This double taxa-
tion, Powell noted, easily could be avoided by the use of an inter-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2956.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2957.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Double taxation is likely to occur if the corporation engages in substantial business, as
measured by its sales, property, and payroll outside of the taxing state.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2958.
94. Id. In situations in which the corporation engages in less business or produces less
profits outside the taxing state, the state would not benefit from applying the apportion-
ment formula method and is under no obligation to calculate its franchise tax in this
manner.
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national agreement requiring the taxing entities to use the same
accounting method.95 Justice Powell thus dismissed the majority's
contention that California would not necessarily reduce the possi-
bility of double taxation by adopting a different accounting
method. Justice Powell maintained that double taxation would be
averted if California simply based its apportionment taxation on
the corporation's domestic income, as reported in its federal tax
report.96
Justice Powell also attacked the constitutionality of the Califor-
ma tax under the second part of the Japan Line test. He argued
that worldwide apportionment taxation of a foreign corporation's
domestic subsidiary necessarily implicates foreign policy issues
that should be left to the federal government.917 The dissent ex-
pressed skepticism over the majority's emphasis on the domestic
incidence of the tax.98 Appraising the reality of the taxing scheme,
the dissent contended that foreign governments were justified in
their concern over the heavier tax burdens faced by companies
domiciled in their jurisdictions. California taxed foreign corpora-
tions through their domestic subsidiaries and discouraged direct
investment overseas. 99 The dissent found particularly disturbing
the states' authority to tax domestic but not foreign corporations
on the basis of worldwide income, thus allowing states to discrimi-
nate against domestic businesses. 100 Finally, Justice Powell ex-
pressed incredulity over the majority's reliance on the absence of
an amicus curiae brief from the Solicitor General; the Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. brief clearly reflected the Solicitor General's
sentiments.10' The California tax, according to Justice Powell,
95. Id. at 2959.
96. Id. at 2957 n.1. This alternative essentially mirrors the solution presented in the Ma-
thas/Conable Bills introduced in Congress in May 1983. See infra notes 183-86 and accom-
panying text.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 2959.
98. Id. at 2959-60; see supra note 85; infra notes 103 & 204 and accompanying text.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 2959.
100. Id. at 2960. Under the equal protection clause and the commerce clause, states are
not allowed to discrimmate in favor of domestic, i.e., state-based businesses. This constitu-
tional restriction does not preclude the state from discriminating against a domestic corpo-
ration. Id. at 2560 n.5.
101. Id. at 2560.
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therefore, was "flatly inconsistent with federal policy. '10 2
The Apportionment Method Violates the Japan Line Test
The majority in Container seemed unimpressed by foreign com-
merce arguments. The Court's reliance on the domestic corpora-
tion distinction,103 although offering hope for foreign-based corpo-
rations, 104 nevertheless was not justified adequately. 105 The Court
had available a substantial and sound basis of both precedent and
general constitutional theory to have decided the case differently
Given the domestic corporation distinction, much of the Court's
analysis, contrary to Justice Powell's view,1°0 would apply to both
foreign and domestic corporations.
Formula Apportionment Creates Double Taxation
The majority based its conclusion that worldwide apportionment
taxation did not unduly burden foreign commerce on the belief
that the arm's length method would not, if implemented, be any
more effective in avoiding double taxation than the California tax.
The Court seemed to prefer apportionment over the arm's length
approach. The Court noted, for example, the "basic theoretical
weaknesses" of the arm's length method.10 7 Moreover, although the
Court observed that the Constitution did not mandate any one
particular method of state taxation, it intimated that the appor-
tionment method was preferable and would be upheld under al-
most all circumstances with only nominal review. 0 8
102. Id. at 2561.
103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. This distinction is quite important; lower
federal courts have adhered to the domestic incidence theory in order to deny standing to
foreign parents seeking to sue on behalf of their American subsidiaries. See, e.g., Alcan Alu-
minum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
104. Amicus briefs filed by foreign-based companies in Container sought to convince the
Court to write a narrow decision, thereby leaving open the opportunity for a foreign parent
to challenge the tax in future litigation. The briefs appear to have succeeded. See Peters,
Supreme Ct. in Container, Upholds State's Broad Power Unitary Taxation Method, 59 J.
TAx'N 300, 303 (1983).
105. See Kaplan, The Unitary Tax Debate, The United States Supreme Court, and
Some Plain English, 10 J. CoRp. TAX'N 283, 292 n.30 (1984).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 2960 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107. 103 S. Ct. at 2948.
108. Id. at 2948-50. Some commentators have found this judicial preference both "ex-
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The Court's conclusion that arm's length and formula apportion-
ment taxation are equally likely to result in double taxation is er-
roneous.10 9 Double taxation is much more likely to occur when two
jurisdictions apply different taxation methods,1 0 and "no other
taxing jurisdiction in an industrially developed country uses such
formulary taxation."''
Double taxation is effectively eliminated in the international
context by bilateral tax treaties. International tax treaties resolve
the inevitable disputes that arise when more than one jurisdiction
seeks to tax the same income.112 As one commentator notes, "Basi-
cally, a tax treaty decides which of the contracting states has the
exclusive or primary right to tax various types of income and it
determines the manner in which double taxation is to be avoided
with respect to such income."113
In the international context, subsidiaries and parents are inde-
pendent legal entities. Accordingly, transactions between a subsidi-
ary and its parent are transactions between unrelated parties."14
The arm's length method of taxation embodies this concept. In ad-
dition, a simple mechanism enables the taxing party to adjust
transfer prices between the parties when their transactions are not
at arm's length." 5
The model arm's length corrective mechanism provision is the
treme" and "troubling." See Kaplan, supra note 105, at 291.
109. See Kaplan, supra note 105, at 291 (the statement by the Court that the "direct
method is as apt to result in double taxation as is formula apportionment-without much
doubt will be regarded as incorrect by most knowledgeable observers").
110. Id. Conversely, formula apportionment m interstate commerce theoretically does not
result m double taxation if all of the states apply the same apportionment method.
111. Id. at 286. The tax is "aberrant in international terms." Id. at 284.
112. See Whittaker, An Examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. Model Tax Treaties His-
tory, Proisions and Application to U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 N.C.J. INT'L LAW & COM. REG. 39,
40 (1983).
113. S. FROMMEL, TAXATION OF BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA
AND THE U.SA 155 (2d ed. 1978).
114. S. FROMMEL, supra note 113, at 70-71. Arm's length prices are the prices established
m "comparable open market transactions between unrelated parties." Id. at 73. For a gen-
eral discussion of international taxation, see Kingson, The Coherence of International Tax-
ation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1981).
115. S. FRoMMEL, supra note 113, at 76.
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O.E.C.D. Model Treaty, Article 9.116 Other countries also include a
corrective mechanism in their tax laws. In the United States, 28
U.S.C. section 482 enables the Internal Revenue Service to make
arm's length adjustments; similarly, in the United Kingdom, the
Inland Revenue Service has authority to adjust profits in transac-
tions that are not at arm's length.117 France has similar provi-
sions, 1"8 and German tax authorities are empowered to impose a
constructive dividend to enforce arm's length dealings." 9
The use of consolidated worldwide profits and apportionment is
rare internationally The United Nations Group of Eminent Per-





(a) an enterprise of a Counteracting State participates directly or indirectly in the man-
agement, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or
(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Con-
tracting State,
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have ac-
crued to one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may
be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State-and
taxes accordingly-profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been
charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have
accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the conditions made between the
two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent enter-
prises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax
charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to
the other provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting
States shall if necessary consult each other.
REPORT OF THE OECD COMMriTEE ON FIsCAL AFFAnRS, MODEL CONVENTION FOR THE Avoin-
ANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATON WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPrrAL (1977), re-
printed in J. BISCHEL, INCOME TAX TREATIES 804 (1978).
117. ICTA 1970 s. 485, cited in S. FROMMEL, supra note 113, at 77.
118. CGI art. 57, cited in S. FRoMMEL, supra note 113, at 78.
119. KSTDV art. 19, cited in S. FROMMEL, supra note 113, at 78.
120. S. FROMMEL, supra note 113, at 63.
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infrequently used the method until it abandoned it in 1965.121 In-
terestingly, the European Court of Justice has characterized mul-
tinationals as "economic units. '122 In the United States, at the fed-
eral level, arm's length taxation is well established. 123
The correct conclusion about double taxation is, therefore, the
one drawn by Justice Powell; double taxation inevitably results
when formula apportionment is applied on a worldwide basis. For-
eign income that has been factored into the formula by California
has already been taxed by the foreign country where it was earned
by the arm's length method. State tax systems, unlike the federal
system,124 do not allow a foreign tax credit, and a foreign country is
not likely to allow the taxpayer to write off taxes paid to American
subgovernments. Container simply ignores the reality of interna-
tional taxation. More significantly, it nullifies the foreign com-
merce clause concerns that underlie Japan Line.125
Formula Apportionment Violates the Federal Uniformity
Concept
Worldwide formula apportionment is a federal issue; the states'
power to tax is in direct conffict with the national government's
authority over foreign affairs. In Container, the Court admitted
that it lacked expertise in foreign affairs. 12 6 It has, however, repeat-
edly protected the federal government's exclusive authority over
that area.127
Constitutional Objections to Formula Apportionment
Both the principle of federal exclusivity and the foreign com-
121. Id.
122. Art. 85(1) EEC Treaty, cited in S. FROMMEL, supra note 113, at 59. It may be that
apportionment makes more sense in federal structures such as the United States and the
European Economic Community.
123. In 1961, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 482,
which would have implemented the apportionment method; the bill was rejected by the
Senate. S. FROMMEL, supra note 113, at 74.
124. See I.R.C. § 901 (1982).
125. See Delap, From Moorman to Chicago Bridge: U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Relat-
ing to "Unitary" Taxation, 2 J. STATE TAx'N 197, 215 (1983).
126. See 103 S. Ct. at 2955.
127. See United States V Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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merce clause justify stricter limits on state legislation of commerce.
Although no express constitutional terms grant foreign affairs
power either to states or to the federal government, the federal
government's exclusive power has long been established.128 Article
I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants certain foreign
policy powers to the Congress, implicitly denying them to the
states; article I, section 10 of the Constitution denies certain for-
eign policy powers to the states, implicitly granting them to the
Congress. These specific allocations reflect a constitutional scheme
that vests all foreign policy power in the federal government.2 9 In
many cases, therefore, state statutes with adverse impacts on for-
eign policy have been struck down as unconstitutional.130 The Su-
preme Court has upheld federal foreign policy power in broad
terms as a necessary incident of national power.113 The nature of
the activity at issue, whether it relates to foreign matters or is es-
sentially domestic, therefore, dictates the source of the power.
The foreign commerce clause similarly demands strict limits on
state statutes affecting foreign policy.13 2 The nature of the com-
merce affected by the state statute determines the kind of scrutiny
it receives, and the distinction between national and local com-
merce delineated by the United States Supreme Court m Cooley v.
Board of Wardens s13 comes into play. In Cooley, the Court estab-
lished that states could regulate local aspects of commerce, but
that only Congress may regulate national commerce.113 Under the
federal exclusivity doctrine, foreign policy is as "national" as an
128. L. TRmBE, supra note 21, § 4-5, at 172.
129. See id. The supremacy clause also empowers the federal government to determine
foreign policy.
130. See, e.g, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (statutory probate scheme); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (alien registration); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275
(1876) (alien entry restrictions); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (alien
entry requirements).
131. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned m the Constitution,
would have vested m the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.").
Language such as this suggests an extraconstitutional characterization of foreign policy
power.
132. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
133. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
134. L. TRIBE, supra note 21, § 6-4, at 324.
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issue can be; the Cooley analysis, therefore, precludes states from
legislating m any way that affects foreign policy
The Court in Container referred to its "residual concern" for
foreign policy implications,'3 5 and found mere "resonances" in-
stead of "implications" arising from the California tax.'-s The
Court also concluded that American foreign policy was "not seri-
ously threatened.' 1 7 Nevertheless, in another federal exclusivity
case, Zschernig v. Miller,' the Court struck down a state probate
statute because it "impair[ed] the effective exercise of the Nation's
foreign policy , [had] a direct impact upon foreign relations
and may well [have] adversely affected the power of the central
government to deal with those problems." 39 Container suggests
not only that state legislation must seriously affect foreign policy
m order to violate the Constitution but also that serious effects
cannot be shown prospectively 140
The Court did not look beyond the threat of foreign retaliation
m searching for foreign policy implications. Foreign reaction was
135. 103 S. Ct. at 2957.
136. Id. at 2955.
137. Id. at 2956.
138. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
139. Id. at 440-41 (emphasis added). In an earlier opinion the Court addressed the
problems of states' involvement in foreign affairs:
If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to
suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If we
should conclude that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for
the injury, would California pay it, or the Federal government? If that govern-
ment has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or
to declare war and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself,
has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as to
leave it in the power of the State to pass laws whose enforcement renders the
general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it
does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?
The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument. The passage of
laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to
our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. It has the power to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character of
those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the
national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure,
embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875).
140. The Court maintained that retaliation from foreign governments was not likely. 103
S. Ct. at 2955-56.
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significant, however, both before and after the decision.
Foreign Reaction to Formula Apportionment
Before Container, the European Economic Community submit-
ted two formal protests to the United States government regarding
apportionment.14 1 In 1981, several industrial federations from Ja-
pan, Great Britain, and Germany observed that many investments
in California had been stalled as a result of California's apportion-
ment tax. 142 Similarly, in the 1980 Double Tax Treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom
sought and initially obtained a provision, Article 9(4), prohibiting
state use of the apportionment method.1 43 Over thirty-five foreign
groups filed amicus curiae briefs opposing unitary taxation in Chi-
cago Bridge & Iron Co.144 Several foreign groups also filed oppos-
ing briefs in Container 145
The British response provides a particularly useful gauge of
world reaction because Britain is one of America's largest trading
partners and perhaps its closest ally 146 Conflict between the
141. Saunders, The Shifty Fifty, FORBES, July 4, 1983, at 131.
142. Disputing a State's Tax Reach, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 2, 1981, at 131-32.
143. Art. 9(4) read as follows:
Except as specifically provided in this Article, in determining the tax liability
of an enterprise doing business in a Contracting State, or in a political subdivi-
sion or local authority of a Contracting State, such Contracting State, political
subdivision, or local authority shall not take into account the income, deduc-
tions, receipts, or outgoings of a related enterprise of the other contracting
State or of an enterprise of any third State related to an enterprise of the other
Contracting State.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, April 16, 1985, United States-United
Kingdom, art. 9(4), reprinted in J. BiscHEL, supra note 116, at 851.
144. See Kaplan, supra note 105, at 291 n.26.
145. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief by Canadian Corporations, Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2937 (1983); Anucus Curiae Brief by British Corporations and
the Unitary Tax Campaign, Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
146. Britain is the largest direct investor in the United States. Wallis, Examining the
Unitary Tax, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 68, 69 (1984). Corporations from other countries also have
been vocal in their criticism and have pressured the American government to change state
tax practices. See, e.g., STATE TAX REV. (CCH) December 6, 1983, at 1 (Japan, Australia,
Canada); Current and Quotable: Canadian Minister of Finance on the Unitary Tax
Method, 20 TAX NOTES 684 (1983); Washington Post, February 11, 1984, at Cl, col. 4 (Ja-
pan); see also Allen, The Container Case: The Unitary Tax in the United States and as
Perceived by the International Community, 18 INT'L LAW 127 (1984) (Japan). Foreign lob-
byists also have brought pressure to bear on state governments, with some success.
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United States and the United Kingdom over worldwide apportion-
ment has existed since 1978 when negotiations began for the re-
newal of the tax treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom. Under the proposed terms of the renegotiated treaty,147
states such as California would have been precluded from taxing
income generated outside of the United States. The proposed
treaty, therefore, would have allowed states to apportion income
resulting from any American operations but would have required
the states to apply the arm's length method of taxation when allo-
cating overseas income from either the foreign parent or the for-
eign subsidiary In approving the renegotiated treaty, however, the
United States Senate deleted the language pertaining to state ap-
portionment.' 4 The British accepted this deletion on the assump-
tion that Congress would enact appropriate legislation forbidding
the states from using the worldwide apportionment method.' 49 The
British also reasoned that the deal included granting American
corporations operating in the United Kingdom the benefit of the
Advance Corporation Tax. 50 Understandably, British officials were
quite bitter when legislation forbidding apportionment failed to
Keidanren, a trade group representing 812 Japanese corporations, and 110 associations, has
been particularly successful. Another powerful group is the Organization for Fair Taxation
of International Organizations (OFTIO). The Unitary Method Fight Doesn't Stop at the
Water's Edge, 24 TAX NoTEs 821 (1984). Governor Orr of Indiana, for example, announced
plans to scrap the state's worldwide unitary tax scheme on the same day that Sony Corp.
disclosed its plan to build a $20 million laser-disc plant in Indiana; a governor's aide admit-
ted that Sony's plan affected the state's decision to abandon the unitary tax scheme. Oregon
likewise repealed its worldwide tax scheme in a special session of the legislature, under pres-
sure from the Japanese. The Japanese company NEC made construction of a $25 million
fiber optics plant contingent upon assurances that worldwide unitary taxation would not be
applied. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1984, at 10, col. 2. The North Dakota Tax Commissioner argued
that Japanese pressure tactics were counterproductive on the whole, but events do not seem
to bear his assertion out. Id. One must question the propriety of having foreign groups ex-
erting economic pressure at the state level. State governments often have neither the exper-
tise nor the influence to respond adequately.
147. See supra note 143.
148. See 125 CONG. REc. 18400 (1978).
149. See Jones, Unitary Taxation-Will 1983 Bring Relief?, ACCOUNTANCY, March 1983,
at 14.
150. J. BISCHm, supra note 116, at 701 (the Advance Corporation Tax was the impetus
for the Art. 9(4) political subdivision language). The Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) is a
tax that a corporation must pay each time it issues a dividend. This tax is credited against
the income tax owed by the corporation. Id. at 691. There is movement in the House of
Commons to remove ACT privileges from American companies. See infra note 152.
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appear. 151
The British have mounted a strong campaign to pressure the
United States Congress to enact the necessary legislation. In 1982,
for example, Michael Grylls, a conservative member of Parliament,
suggested in amendments to the 1982 Finance Bill that a similar
tax be imposed on American companies doing business in the
United Kingdom. 15 2 Mr. Grylls also proposed in September 1983
that the ACT credit accorded American corporations be with-
drawn.15 3 The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has joined
the British Unitary Tax Campaign in its fight against unitary taxa-
tion."5 At its 1983 annual conference, the CBI called for abroga-
tion of the 1980 tax treaty, and planned to apply pressure in the
House of Commons to withdraw the tax privileges afforded Ameri-
can companies.' 55 Peter Welch, British Chairman of the Unitary
Tax Campaign, sent Treasury Secretary Regan a pot of tea, evok-
ing the Boston Tea Party to demonstrate British outrage over state
worldwide unitary taxation. 5 6
The Thatcher government has been vocal in its criticism of uni-
tary taxation. Prime Minister Thatcher made her opposition to the
state scheme known to President Reagan in her Fall 1983 visit to
151. In hearings before Congress in 1980, British officials testified that state use of the
worldwide apportionment method "violate[d] the treaties of Friendship and Commerce"
and "invite[d] retaliation," thus seriously burdening American businesses overseas. State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income: Hearings on S.983
Before the Sub-Committee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the State
Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 75 (1980) (statement of John S. Nolan, British
National Committee, International Court of Justice).
152. Euromarket News, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH), May 18, 1982, at 4, 5.
153. Euromarket News, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH), Sept. 28, 1983, at 5. Chancellor of the
Exchequer Nigel Lawson announced that he would await the results of the Treasury Task
Force on Unitary Taxation before considering Mr. Grylls's proposal to withdraw the ACT
from companies domiciled in worldwide unitary states. Shepard, British Unitary Retalia-
tion Unlikely Just Yet, 24 TAx NOTES 224 (1984). Such threats are taken seriously by
American firms. Robert Ragland, of the National Association of Manufacturers, commented
that "some companies like Ford are going to get hit right between the eyes." Wilson, The
Furor Over Unitary Taxes, DUN'S BUSINSS MONTH, January 1984, at 65.
154. Euromarket News, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) August 23, 1983, at 6.
155. Euromarket News, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) Nov. 22, 1983, at 7. An executive from
BAT Industries commented that if the unitary tax practices were allowed to continue, "we
can say goodbye to the fruits of 40 years of hard work spent negotiating tax treaties." Id. at
7-8.
156. Wallis, Examining the Unitary Tax, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 68, 69 (1984).
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America.157 Similarly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed
his government's disappointment over the Container decision and
also pressed for action by the executive to rectify the unitary tax
problem.' 58 Finally, in an Official Note submitted to the United
States Treasury Working Group on Unitary Taxation, the British
government criticized apportionment taxation as being opposed to
"well-established international principles and practices of taxa-
tion.159 The Note further argued that apportionment taxation
presented unreasonable fiscal and administrative burdens and was
damaging to American relations with the United Kingdom and
other countries. 60
The reaction of the British government and the British business
community clearly indicates the kind of adverse impact that state
worldwide apportionment taxation has had on American foreign
policy and on international commercial relations. The Supreme
Court in Container did not address adequately our trading part-
ners' concerns or the potential foreign policy ramifications of up-
holding the California tax. Regardless of whether the issues liti-
gated in Container involved domestic-based corporations, the
Court should have noted that states applying worldwide apportion-
ment do not always distinguish between foreign and domestic par-
ents. 161 If the Court had been more concerned about foreign policy
effects, it would have recognized the deleterious consequences that
result from state worldwide apportionment taxation.
State worldwide apportionment taxation clearly has affected for-
eign policy The federal government has taken the brunt of the re-
action from our trading partners, having expended significant re-
157. Unitary Taxation: A California Tea-Party?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1983, at 19.
158. Current and Quotable: The Chancellor of the Exechequer on the Unitary Tax
Method, 20 TAX NOTES 450 (1983).
159. Euromarket News, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 28, 1983, at 7-8.
160. Id. J.D. Taylor Thompson, Commissioner and Under-Secretary of Britain's Inland
Revenue, reiterated these views at a Washington, D.C. seminar hosted by Senator Mathias
and Representative Wyden on worldwide unitary taxation. Showcase for Opponents of the
Unitary Method, 24 TAx NOTES 1219-20 (1984). The British press also has been critical of
state unitary taxation. See Exporting American Taxes, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1983, at 13; Uni-
tary Taxation: A Californian Tea-Party?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1983, at 19; Unite and
Soak, THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 1983, at 22.




sources responding to the problem. Several potentially damaging
actions by foreign governments may ensue. First, foreign govern-
ments may retaliate against American corporations doing business
in their countries by suspending existing tax advantages or by im-
posing new tax burdens. Second, foreign governments may demand
renegotiation of existing tax treaties, which may be detrimental to
the interests of Americans and American corporations operating
abroad. Third, a subtler form of damage is the potential loss of
good will between nations, which may affect other aspects of for-
eign relations. Relations between the United States and its inter-
national partners have suffered, and are in danger of suffering even
greater harm, as a direct consequence of state activity The inter-
national situation created by California's taxing scheme, therefore,
is a perfect case for federal preemption under either a dormant
commerce clause or a general federal exclusivity theory 162
Invalidating California's tax scheme would have been contrary to
the Burger Court's general states rights orientation.16 3 The Court's
162. See Javaras & Browne, Litigation Prospects After Container: The Foreign Parent
Issue, 21 TAX NOTS 1027, 1032 (1984).
163. The states rights orientation has been bolstered by the mixed signals that the Rea-
gan Administration has given on the unitary tax Issue. In Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., the
Solicitor General in an amicus curiae brief criticized the tax scheme. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Container, President Reagan refused to press for a rehearing of
Container and instructed the Treasury Group Task Force on Unitary Taxation, which was
created following the Container decision, not to consider preemptive legislation. ST. TAx
REV. (CCH), December 13, 1983, at 1; see also Chairman's Report on the Worldwide Unt-
tary Taxation Working Group: Activities, Issues and Recommendations, 24 TAX NOTES
581, 583 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report]. One should remember that Presi-
dent Reagan as Governor of California observed that "federal intervention in state tax mat-
ters is objectionable in principle." A California Tea-Party?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1983, at
23. Secretary Reagan clarified the position of the Executive in his letter to the President
accompanying the Report of the Treasury Task Force on Unitary Taxation. The Treasury
Department views state worldwide unitary taxation as troublesome, noting that if the states
enact corrective water's edge legislation, "the United States will be able to speak with one
voice in dealing with its foreign trading partners." 24 TAx NOTES, at 81. The State Depart-
ment also spoke on the issue. In his remarks before the Coral Gables Chamber of Com-
merce, W. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, called state unitary taxation
a "major irritant [which] may rank with the most controversial issues I have handled in
the economic area." Wallis, Examining the Unitary Tax, 84 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 68, 69 (1984).
The General Accounting Office pointed out during the course of the Task Force proceed-
ings that state tax practices presented a "bewildering variety" of rules for the multistate
and multinational business, raising international tax issues and states' rights issues that
should be resolved by Congress. Task Force Report, at 584.
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decision in Container, however, upset the basic federal principle
that the conduct of American foreign affairs is the exclusive do-
main of the federal government. 64 Conduct includes the day-to-
day relations between governments and state taxation has affected
and disrupted those relations. On this basis alone, the Court
should have struck down California's use of worldwide unitary
apportionment.
ALTERNATIVES TO FORMULA APPORTIONMENT
The Treaty Alternative
One way of preventing the states from apportioning corporate
income on a worldwide basis is to modify existing treaties. Imple-
menting the British modification discussed above is a possible so-
lution. Language in the O.E.C.D. Model Treaty, also discussed
above, would be an even more complete and effective modification.
The O.E.C.D. Treaty covers taxes "imposed on behalf of its politi-
cal subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the manner in
which they are levied."'16 5
The advantage of the treaty alternative is that a valid treaty
would have the preemptive force of a federal statute6 6 but would
require only Senate approval. The great disadvantage of abolishing
the tax by treaty is that, because these treaties are usually bilat-
eral, new treaties would have to be negotiated with each treaty
partner.
Alternative State Policies Toward Taxation of Multinationals
States might voluntarily adopt a water's edge approach, only ap-
plying the apportionment method to corporate activities within the
United States. 167 Most states use the water's edge method of ap-
164. "In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the peo-
ple of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national
power." Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933).
165. MODEL CONVENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION WITH RESPECT TO
TAXEs ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, REPORT OF THE O.E.C.D. COMMITTEE ON FIsCAL AFFAIRS
1977, reprinted in J. BISCHEL, supra note 116, at 793, 798. The tax treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom only covers taxes imposed by the contracting state.
See J. BISCHEL, supra note 116, at 820.
166. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1956).
167. Massachusetts chose to track Container. Its scheme applies worldwide unitary taxa-
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portionment. 65 Interestingly, Illinois, in defining "unitary group,"
excludes from the group "members whose business activity outside
the United States is 80 percent or more of any such member's total
business activity."169 Florida joined the ranks of states applying
worldwide apportionment shortly after the Court decided the
Container case.11 0
The Reagan administration favors the voluntary approach.171 In
May 1984, the Treasury Task Force on Worldwide Unitary Taxa-
tion-a group of state, business, and federal representa-
tives-released its results.7 2 The Group was unable to reach a con-
crete solution. In fact, subsequent squabbling over the conclusions
of the Group has undermined substantially the utility of the Task
Force Report.
In the Report, Treasury Secretary Regan announced that the
Group had agreed in principle to the water's edge approach and
had agreed to increased federal administrative assistance in pro-
moting corporate disclosure of information.' The Group could not
agree either on the treatment of dividends received by domestic
parents from foreign subsidiaries or on the treatment of corpora-
tions whose participation in foreign operations is twenty percent or
less of its total business. 7 4
The Governors of California and Idaho, participants in the
Group, filed a separate statement when Secretary Regan issued a
supplemental report later in 1984.1 5 The governors criticized Sec-
retary Regan for his issuance of an ultimatum in his letter to Presi-
tion to domestic multinationals while applying water's edge to foreign multinationals. Solet,
Unitary Taxation Comes to Massachusetts, 28 BOSTON BAR J. 9, 13-14 (1984).
168. Eleven states now employ worldwide unitary taxation. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1984, at
10, col. 2.
169. 1983 ILL. LEGIS. SERV. 1355 (West).
170. 1983 FLA. LEGIS. SERV. 349 (West). Subsequently, both houses of the Florida legisla-
ture passed differing repeals of worldwide unitary taxation and are expected to resolve their
differences in the next legislative session. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1984, at 10. Other states have
repudiated the worldwide unitary taxing method. See infra notes 175-79.
171. See supra note 163.
172. See Chairman's Report on the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group, Activ-
ities, Issues and Recommendations, 24 TAx NOTES 581, 583 (1984).
173. Task Force Report, supra note 164, at 584-85.
174. Id. at 585.
175. Additional Views of Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group Members, 24
TAX NOTES 1043 (1984).
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dent Reagan in May 1984, which stated that he, Secretary Regan,
would recommend federal preemptive legislation if the states did
not make substantial progress by July 31, 1985.176 The governors
also highlighted their differences with Secretary Regan's percep-
tion of consensus. They had "significant differences" with Secre-
tary Regan and wished to reiterate that acceptance of the water's
edge approach was conditioned on the federal government's active
assistance in enforcing arm's length pricing and in forcing compa-
nies to be honest in providing tax information.17 7 The Treasury
Secretary claimed consensus where none existed. We are, therefore,
making little progress in solving the problem by state volunteer-
IsM. 178 Of course, the Task Force's failure may be irrelevant as
states capitulate to foreign pressure.1 79
The Task Force experience suggests that voluntary abandon-
ment of apportionment taxation is improbable. Substantial reve-
nue is at issue, revenue that is needed to fulfill increasing state
social policy obligations.180
Congressinal Alternatwes
The best, but perhaps the most elusive solution, is express con-
gressional preemption of state worldwide apportionment tax. Since
1965, Congressmen have introduced no less than thirty-one bills
that would prohibit states from applying the apportionment
method of taxation."1 Recent bills are Senate bills 655182 and
1225183 and House Reports 2918184 and 4980.185 These bills would
176. Id.
177. Id., see also Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
178. This is unfortunate, considering that the Task Force was the Administration's "best
hope." N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984, at Dl, col. 2. President Reagan had hoped to take a
compromise solution with him to the London Economic Summit m July 1984. A Taxing
War on Sticky-Fingered States, FORTUNE, June 25, 1984, at 113.
179. See supra note 146.
180. See Peirce, Taxing of Worldwide Income Calls for Restraint by States, NATION'S
CITIES WEEKLY, July 18, 1983, at 5. States utilizing worldwide unitary taxation estimate
annual revenues of $600 million from the practice. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984, at Dll, col. 2.
181. Richman, The Effect of State Taxes on Multinational Companies, 14TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATiON (PLI), 215, 228 (1983).
182. S. 655, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
183. S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
184. H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1983).
185. The newest federal preemption proposal is H.R. 4980, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983)
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limit worldwide apportionment by prohibiting states from taxing
foreign source income unless the income is subject to federal in-
come taxation.1
8 6
Under the statutory solution to the unitary tax problem, there-
fore, states are limited to the apportionment taxation of foreign-
source income that returns to the United States. This solution as-
sumes that federal methods for determining foreign income on the
federal tax return are adequate.18 7 Congress, however, seems satis-
fied with this method. The advantage of this solution is that it con-
forms state practice to federal and international practice when
conformity is necessary, but does not enforce conformity when
only interstate commerce is affected. The unitary tax, as originally
developed to deal with interstate taxation problems, would remain
intact.
THE FOREIGN PARENTS STANDING PROBLEM
A common problem faced by foreign-owned companies is their
inability to acquire standing in federal courts. In the last few years,
three foreign parent corporations have tried to challenge Califor-
nia's worldwide apportionment scheme. In all three cases, however,
the court dismissed the suit on the ground that the corporation
lacked standing.' In EMI Ltd. v. Bennett,'89 for example, the
(proposed by Rep. Ron Wyden). H.R. 4980 mirrors the Mathias/Conable bills.
186. S. 1225 reads in pertinent part:
SEC. 7518 INCOME OF CORPORATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
(a) In General.-Where two or more corporations are members of the same affiliated group
of corporations-
(1) for purposes of imposing an income tax on any corporation which is a member of
such group, no State, or political subdivision thereof, may take into account, or include
in income subject to such tax, any amount of income of, or attributable to,
(2) any other corporation which is a member of such group and which is a foreign cor-
poration, unless such amount is includable in the gross income of the corporation de-
scribed in paragraph (1) for purposes of chapter 1 (including any amount includable in
gross income under subpart F of part III of subchapter N of chapter 1) for the taxable
year in which or with which the taxable period (for purposes of State or local law) ends.
S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
187. State representatives on the Treasury Unitary Tax Force hinged their acceptance of
the water's edge approach to federal assistance m enforcement and in reporting procedures.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
188. Shell Petroleum v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, Shell Petro-
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia refused to hear a suit brought by EMI, Ltd., a British corpora-
tion, challenging California's apportionment taxation of its Ameri-
can subsidiary The British corporation contended that it had
standing to bring the suit because the California tax diminished
the value of its majority stock in the subsidiary 190 The court ruled
that the corporation lacked standing on the ground that, because
California assessed a tax against the subsidiary and not the parent,
EMI suffered only an indirect harm as a shareholder and thus
lacked any right to sue.191 The primary injury, and the primary
right to sue, according to the court, belonged to the corporation,
and only derivatively to the shareholder. 92 On the same basis, the
court concluded that the treaty provisions of the United States-
United Kingdom Income Tax Convention did not grant standing
to the foreign corporation. 193
The facts in Shell Petroleum v. Graves9 4 were similar to those
in EMI Ltd. Shell, a Netherlands company, opposed California's
application of a umtary tax on two of its subsidiaries doing busi-
ness in California on the basis that the tax would disproportion-
ately attribute income to the state of California. 195 Applying the
same reasoning as that set forth in EMI Ltd., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Shell lacked
standing to sue because shareholders generally cannot sue to seek
redress of an injury to the corporation. 98 The court observed,
moreover, that the United States-Netherlands Treaty did not
grant standing to the Netherlands corporation. 197 Finally, the court
leum v. Franchetti, 104 S. Ct. 537; Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 558 F Supp.
624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); EMI Ltd. v. Bennett, 560 F Supp. 134 (N.D. Cal. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1189 (1983). For a discussion of the standing issue, see Javares & Browne, supra
note 163.
189. 560 F Supp. 134 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
190. Id. at 135. Shell also challenged the tax because of the Franchise Tax Board's re-
quest for information, which Shell could not supply under United Kingdom law. The court




194. 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 537.





ruled that because "plain, speedy and efficient" state remedies re-
mained available to Shell, Shell's claim was not ripe for
adjudication.'98
In the most recent foreign parent case, Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Board,9 ' a Canadian parent, Alcan, challenged the
application of California's unitary tax to its wholly owned Ameri-
can subsidiary, Alcancorp. 0 ° Unlike Shell and EMI, Alcan main-
tained that the tax directly injured it as the parent corporation.20 '
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that, because California had not levied a direct tax on
the parent corporation, Alcan had not suffered a direct injury
Therefore, Alcan lacked standing to bring suit in federal court.20 2
The district court's reasoning in Alcan is disturbing, particularly
when read in conjunction with the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Container In ruling that the foreign parent corporation
lacked standing, the court relied on its conclusion that the Ameri-
can subsidiary was the taxpayer. The court thus rejected Alcan's
assertion that California imposed a tax directly upon the parent
company, reasoning that because the unitary tax by definition did
not tax nonCalifornia income, foreign commerce was not taxed at
all.203 If the courts always consider the American subsidiary to be
the taxpayer, however, the tax will always be domestic in nature,
and, under the "domestic incidence" language in Container, no
foreign commerce issue ever will be raised.20 4 The foreign parent
corporation thus will be denied any opportunity to contest the con-
stitutionality of a state's taxation of its American subsidiary under
the foreign commerce clause.20 5 The district court's rationale in Al-
can extends the fiction of the unitary business to a new extreme.
198. Id. at 597.
199. 558 F Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
200. Id. at 625.
201. Id. at 627.
202. Id. at 627-28.
203. Id. at 627.
204. "As previously demonstrated, the unitary tax is imposed neither upon foreign com-
merce nor upon Alcan itself." Id. at 628 (emphasis m original). Such a statement runs
counter to the Supreme Court's reservation of the foreign parent issue m Container. See
supra note 4.
205. See J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Container upheld the constitutionality of
state worldwide apportionment taxation of unitary businesses. The
Court, however, did not adequately consider the important concept
of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs or the heightened scrutiny
demanded when foreign commerce is affected by state legislation.
Perhaps when a foreign-based corporation acquires standing, a dif-
ferent decision will follow.
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